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This study investigated theeffectonworryofbiasedattentional engagementanddisengagement.Variants
of a novel attentionmodiﬁcation paradigmwere developed, designed to induce a group difference either
in participants’ tendency to selectively engage with, or disengage from, threatening meanings. An index
of threat bias, reﬂecting relative speeding to process threat word compared to non-threat word content,
conﬁrmed thatbothprocedureswereeffective in inducingdifferential attentional bias. Importantly,wheneywords:
ttention
ttentional engagement
ttentional disengagement
orry
the induced group difference in attentional bias followed the procedure designed to inﬂuence selective
engagementwith threatmeanings, it also gave rise to a corresponding groupdifference inworry. Thiswas
not the case when it was induced by the procedure designed to inﬂuence selective disengagement from
threat meanings. These ﬁndings suggest that facilitated attentional engagement with threat meanings
may causally contribute to variability in worry.
Crow Open access under CC BY license.ognitive bias modiﬁcation
nxiety
. Introduction
Worry is a central cognitive symptom of anxiety observed
crossmany anxiety disorders, and uncontrollable worry is the key
eﬁning feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; American
sychiatric Association, 1994). Heightened anxiety vulnerability is
haracterized by a selective attentional bias favouring threaten-
ng information, which some clinical theorists contend makes a
ausal contribution to anxiety symptomology, such as excessive
orry (cf. Mathews &MacLeod, 1994; Mathews &MacLeod, 2005).
his attentional bias has been demonstrated using a range of dif-
erent tasks, including the emotional Stroop task (cf., Williams,
atts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), and the dot-probe task (e.g.,
acLeod&Mathews, 1988;MacLeod,Mathews&Tata, 1986;Mogg,
athews, & Eysenck, 1992).
There has been recent debate concerning whether elevated
nxiety vulnerability reﬂects facilitated attentional engagement
ith, or impaired subsequent disengagement from, threatening
nformation. Some evidence suggests that such vulnerability is
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associated with speeded attentional engagement with the locus of
threatening information (Garner, Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Koster,
Crombes, Verschuere, Damme, &Wiersema, 2006). However, there
also is evidence that it is associated with a slowing to disen-
gage attention from the locus of such information (Amir, Elias,
Klumpp & Przeworski, 2003; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001;
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Salemink, van
den Hout & Kindt, 2007; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). On occasions,
researchers have found evidence of both attentional effects in anx-
ious participants (Mathews, Fox, Yiend & Calder, 2003). While this
suggests that facilitated engagement with threat, and impaired
disengagement from threat, may both be associated with anxiety
vulnerability, such ﬁndings do not reveal whether the engagement
bias, thedisengagementbias, or both, contribute causally to anxiety
symptoms such as worry.
Though not resolving this speciﬁc issue, the recent use of cog-
nitive bias modiﬁcation procedures has established that biased
attention does contribute to worry. Recent studies using mod-
erate and high level worriers (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010;
Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010) employed an attention modiﬁca-
tion approach, based on that introduced by MacLeod, Rutherford,
Campbell, EbsworthyandHolker (2002), todemonstrate that atten-
tional bias causally impacts on worry. For example, Hayes et al.
(2010) randomly assigned high worriers to either a training condi-
tion in which they repeatedly directed their attention away from
nse.
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he source of worry-related information and towards benign infor-
ation, or to a control condition not designed to modify attention.
his procedure served to induce a group difference in attentional
ias, such that the former participants came to display signiﬁ-
antly less evidence of selective attention to threat than did the
atter. All participants then reported on thought intrusions while
ocusing on their breathing, before and after an instructed worry
eriod (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & De Pree, 1983; Ruscio
Borkovec, 2004). Again a signiﬁcant group difference was evi-
ent, with those individuals exposed to benign attentional training
eporting less negative thought intrusions than control partici-
ants.
While theseﬁndings suggest that attentionalbiasmakesacausal
ontribution to worry, they do not reveal whether it is enhanced
ttentional engagement with threat, impaired attentional disen-
agement from threat, or both, that exerts this causal impact. To
ddress this issue, itwouldbenecessary toexaminewhether induc-
ng a group difference in attentional engagement with threat, or
nducing a group difference in attentional disengagement from
hreat, each serve to produce a corresponding group difference
n negative thought intrusions, during a subsequent worry assess-
ent task.
It is important to note that attention to the spatial locus of
threat stimulus is not necessarily the same as attention to the
hreatening meaning of this stimulus, and it is selective attention
o threat meanings that is assumed to be the critical causal fac-
or in anxiety. Moving attention toward a given spatial locus does
ot ensure the semantic processing of stimuli in that region, just
s moving attention away from a previously attended spatial locus
oes not preclude the continued semantic processing of informa-
ion presented there. For example, non-anxious individuals may
void focusing on the threatening meaning of a spatially attended
timulus,while anxious individualsmaynot only process the threat
eaning but also continue to focus on it even after shifting atten-
ion away from the stimulus location. In this way, an external
hreat cue could trigger worry, involving attention to internally
aintained threateningmeanings, which then continues long after
isengagement from the location of the original cue.
To determine the contribution to worry made by biased atten-
ion to threat meanings, a methodology is required that can
nﬂuence the ease with which attention can be shifted selectively
owards or away from processing threatening meanings. In the
resent study, this was achieved using a novel procedure that
equired participants to switch between two different types of
ecision concerning the same stimulus word; an affective deci-
ion requiring semantic access (good or bad?), and a non-semantic
tructural decision (upper or lower case letters?).
By employing two alternative variants of this procedure, we
ought to induce a group difference in selective attention to threat
n either one of two quite different ways. One approach was
esigned to induce such a difference through training biased selec-
ive attentional engagement with threat meanings. This involved
articipants repeatedly switching from structural to affective deci-
ions for one particular valence of stimuli, with some participants
eing required to consistently make this switch only for threat
ords (to encourage selective engagement with threat meanings),
nd others being required to consistentlymake this switch only for
on-threat words (to discourage selective engagement with threat
eanings). The other approach was designed to induce a group
ifference in selective attention to threat through training biased
ttentional disengagement from threat meanings. This involved
articipants repeatedly switching from affective to structural deci-
ions for one particular valence of stimuli, with some participants
eing required to consistently make this switch only for threat
ords (to encourage selective disengagement from threat mean-
ngs), and others being required to consistently make the switchDisorders 25 (2011) 272–277 273
only for non-threat words (to discourage selective disengagement
from threat meanings).
If group differences in attention to threat can be successfully
induced in each of these twoways then, by comparing such groups
in terms of subsequently reported negative thought intrusions,
it will be possible to determine whether differential attentional
engagement with threat, and/or differential attentional disengage-
ment from threat, causally contribute to differential worry.
2. Method
2.1. Design
The study involved two consecutive phases: an attentional bias
induction phase and a worry assessment phase. Participants were
assigned at random either to a training procedure designed to
induce a group difference in engagement bias, or to a training
procedure designed to induce a group difference in disengage-
ment bias. In each case, half the participants were exposed to a
condition intended either to encourage, or to discourage, the selec-
tive processing of threatening meanings. Thus, participants were
randomly allocated to one of the four attentional bias induction
conditions: (1) increase threat processing by encouraging selective
engagement with threat meanings; (2) increase threat processing
by discouraging selective disengagement from threat meanings;
(3) decrease threat processing by discouraging selective engage-
ment with threat meanings; or (4) decrease threat processing by
encouraging selective disengagement from threat meanings. In all
cases, participants were required to make two consecutive deci-
sions about each target word, either concerning its structure (i.e.
upper or lower case of the letters) or its semantic content (affective
valence), but these decisions varied according to attentional bias
induction condition (see Table 1).
Following the attention bias induction phase, all participants
completed Hayes et al.’s (2010) worry task, which involved cate-
gorising the valence of thought intrusions that occurred before and
after an instructed worry period. Participants subsequently pro-
vided expanded descriptions of these thought intrusions, enabling
anassessor,whowasnot informedof groupallocation, to categorise
their valence.
2.2. Participants
Sixty-four student participants were selected based on their
scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer,
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Due to the concern that induc-
ing selective attention to threat meanings might have adverse
effects on very high trait worriers, only participants who scored
55 or below on the PSWQ were invited to take part in the study
(Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Of the 64 volunteers, 16 were ran-
domly allocated to each of the following training conditions: (i)
encourage selective engagement with threat meanings (3 males
and 13 females); (ii) discourage selective disengagement from
threat meanings (9 males and 7 females); (iii) discourage selec-
tive engagement with threat meanings (7 males and 9 females);
and (iv) encourage selective disengagement from threat meanings
(4 males and 12 females). Note that conditions (i) and (ii) both are
designed to induce attentional bias that favours the processing of
threatmeanings,while conditions (iii) and (iv) instead are designed
to induce attentional bias that compromises processing of threat
meanings. The ratio of males to females selected for each group did
not signiﬁcantly differ, 2(3, N=64) =6.18, ns. Groups also did not
differ signiﬁcantly in scores on the PSWQ (M=41.7; SD=7.3; F(3,
60) =2.20, ns.) or State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait version (STAI-
T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; M=39.3;
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Table 1
Outline of the design showing the ﬁrst and second decision task for threat and non-threat words in each condition.
Bias induction direction Condition Decision 1 Decision 2
Increase threat processing
Encourage threat engagement Word structure Valence for threat or structure for non-threat
Discourage threat disengagement Word valence Valence for threat or structure for non-threat
Decrease threat processing
Discourage threat engagement Word Structure Structure for threat or valence for non-threat
Encourage threat disengagement Word valence Structure for threat or valence for non-threat
Note: The second decision (about its valence or structure) varied by word type (threat or non-threat). For example, the encourage threat engagement condition involved an
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fnitial structural decision, followed by an emotional valence decision (good or bad?)
ords, thus requiring a shift to engagement with emotional meaning for threat but
D=5.9; F<1). Average age was 19.5 (SD=2.7), with no signiﬁcant
ge difference between groups, F<1.
.3. Materials
.3.1. Experimental stimuli
A set of 96 words (48 threat and 48 non-threat) was selected
rom an initial pool of 377 words, based on ratings provided by
en independent judges. These judges rated each item on a 7-point
cale (1 = verypositive, 7 = verynegative). The threatwords selected
or use all had a mean rating above 6.00 (M=6.44, SD=0.70), while
he non-threat words all had a mean rating below 3.00 (M=1.76,
D=0.77). Of theﬁnal set of 96words, 64were assigned to attention
odiﬁcation trials and 32 to test trials.
.3.2. Emotional assessment instruments
Trait worry level was measured using the Penn State Worry
uestionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), a 16-itemmeasure con-
isting of statements about worry (e.g., “Once I start worrying, I
an’t stop”), each with a 5-point answer scale ranging from 1 (not
t all typical of me) to 5 (very typical of me) yielding a total score
anging from 16 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater worry
evels. The PSWQ has good psychometric properties in student,
ommunity, and clinical samples,with studies reporting high inter-
al consistency, short-term retest reliability, and convergent and
riterion related validity (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Davey,
993).
Trait anxietywasmeasured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inven-
ory (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983), consisting of 20 anxiety
ymptoms that participants rate for frequency of occurrence.
cores range between 20 and 80, with a higher score indicating
reater anxiety. The STAI-T has good internal consistency (.89) and
est–retest reliability (.88; Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002).
.3.3. Attentional bias induction tasks
These tasks required participants to switch attention between
he structure and the semantic content of words, by making two
equential decisions about every word relating either to the form
f the letters in which it was written (i.e. whether the word was
resented in “big letters”/“upper case” or “small letters”/“lower
ase”), or to its emotional meaning (i.e. whether the word was
positive”/“good” or “negative”/“bad” in meaning).1
On each trial a ﬁxation cross appeared in the centre of the screen
or 1500ms, after which the ﬁrst question appeared (e.g., ‘Big?’).
fter 1000ms this was replaced by a target word (e.g., CANCER)
hat appeared for 400ms. Participants were instructed to quickly
nswer the ﬁrst question correctly, by pressing the corresponding
1 Two sets of labels were used for each question type, such that two sequential
uestions concerning structure (or valence) always differed even if they related
o the same concept (e.g., “big letters?” followed by “upper case?”, or “positive?”
ollowed by “good?”).eatwords but a structural (e.g. upper or lower case letters?) decision for non-threat
on-threat words.
“y” (yes) or “n” (no) key. Incorrect responses were signaled by a
short error tone. Immediately following registration of the partici-
pant’s response, the secondquestion about theword appeared (e.g.,
‘Positive?’). Thenext trial commenced1500msafter theparticipant
responded to the second question.
The exact sequence of events within trials varied according
to participant group (see Table 1 for a summary of the different
bias induction conditions). Half the participants were exposed to a
procedure designed to induce a group difference in selective atten-
tional engagementwith threatmeanings. For these participants the
ﬁrst decision always concerned the structure of theword, to ensure
that initially attention was focused on this non-semantic aspect
of the stimulus. The participant then was immediately required
to make a second judgment about the stimulus, which could con-
cern either structure again, or semantic content. For the subset of
such participants exposed to the condition designed to encourage
selective engagement with threat meanings, this second decision
always concerned valence when the target word was threaten-
ing, and structure when it was non-threatening. Thus, making
this second decision required these participants to move attention
from stimulus structure to selectively engagewith themeanings of
threatening, but not non-threateningwords. For the other subset of
such participants, who were exposed to the condition designed to
discourage selective engagementwith threatmeanings, the second
decision always concerned valencewhen the target wordwas non-
threatening, and structure when it was threatening. Thus, making
this second decision required these participants to move attention
from stimulus structure to selectively engagewith themeanings of
non-threatening, but not threatening words.
The remaining participants were assigned to a procedure
designed to induce a group difference in selective attentional dis-
engagement from threatmeanings. These participants alwayswere
required to make their ﬁrst decision about the valence of each
word, to ensure that attention was initially focused on stimulus
meaning. For the subset exposed to the condition designed to dis-
courage selective disengagement from threatmeanings, the second
decision always concerned stimulus valence when the word was
threatening, and structure when the word was non-threatening.
Thus, making this second decision required selective disengage-
ment from the content of non-threatening words, but not from
the content of threat words. Finally, for those participants exposed
to the condition designed to encourage selective disengagement
from threat meanings, the second decision concerned structure
when the word was threatening, and valence when the word was
non-threatening. Thus, making this second decision required these
participants to selectively disengage attention from the content of
threat words, but not from the content of non-threatening words.
The task delivered a total of 256 attention bias induction trials,
across four consecutive blocks of 64 such trials,with eachwordpre-
sented once per block in random order. Participants were offered
a rest break after each block. Participants also completed 32 atten-
tional bias assessment trials, 16 using new threat words and 16
using new non-threat words. In these assessment trials, although
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he ﬁrst decision about each stimulus was of the type required in
he bias induction trials completed by the participant, the second
ecision always concerned stimulus valence. The degree to which
articipants were relatively faster to make this content decision
n threat words, compared to non-threat words, on these assess-
ent trials, provided an index of attentional preference for threat
eanings. This made it possible to determine whether the bias
nduction procedures did induce a group differences in attentional
ias.
.4. Filler task
The Speed of Comprehension Test (Version A; Baddeley, Emslie,
Nimmo-Smith, 1992) was administered as a ﬁller to reduce the
ikelihood of differences in mood prior to the worry task. Partici-
ants decided whether 100 sentences were true or false for 2 min.
o minimize anxiety instructions emphasized that speed was not
mportant.
.5. Worry task
This task was based on that adopted by Hayes et al. (2010),
tself based on the method developed by Borkovec et al. (1983).
here were three phases: a 5min pre-worry induction breathing
ocus period, which assessed tendency to worry prior to its active
xperimental induction; a 5min period of worrying; and a further
min post-worry induction breathing focus period,which assessed
he persistence of the induced worry. During each breathing focus
eriod participantswere instructed to focus their attention on their
reathing. Twelve tones were presented at random intervals of
0–30 s (Donaldson, 2004), signaling participants to report if their
ttention was focused on their breathing, or if they were experi-
ncing a thought intrusion. If the latter, they indicated whether it
as positive, benign, or negative, and provided a brief description
e.g., “positive – going on holiday”).
After the pre-worry breathing focus period, participants iden-
iﬁed a current worry topic which was discussed brieﬂy with the
xperimenter to ensure that it was related to a potentially nega-
ive future situation. They were then asked to continue to silently
orry about this topic for 5min, and the experimenter left the
oom. After 5min the experimenter returned and the post-worry
reathing focus period was completed.
Finally, participants were asked to expand on the thought
ntrusions reported during the breathing focus periods. For each
ntrusion, the experimenter read aloud the participant’s summary,
nd asked them to describe what was going through their minds
t the moment they originally had that thought. Descriptions
ere recorded for later rating by a psychologist, who assessed
he valence of each intrusion. To assess reliability, a psychology
tudent also rated 16 participants’ thought expansions. Neither
ssessor was informed about group allocation, nor when the intru-
ion occurred. Inter-rater reliability for assessors’ valence ratings
sing Cohen’s Kappa statistic (k) was 0.89.
.6. Procedure
Participants initially completed the PSWQ and STAI-T. After
nstructions and 16 practice trials, the attentional bias induction
ask was administered. This was followed by the ﬁller task. Par-
icipants then received instructions for the worry task, practiced
ocusing on their breathing and providing a capsule summary of
heir thoughts at three random time intervals within 45 s. When it
as clear that all instructions were understood, participants were
dministered the worry task. Finally participants were debriefed
nd paid £15 ($22 USD) or given course credit.Disorders 25 (2011) 272–277 275
3. Results
3.1. Data analytic plan
Data from the attentional bias induction task was ﬁrst analyzed
for accuracy to determine if therewere any group differences. Then
the reaction time data from the assessment trials were investi-
gated in the following way. To determine whether the task was
successful in inducing differential attentional bias to threat as
intended, the median response latencies for the second (valence)
decision were calculated for each participant. Then a threat bias
indexwas computed for each participant, reﬂecting relative speed-
ing to make this content decision on threat words compared to
non-threat words (by subtracting median latency on threat words
from median latency on non-threat words). A higher score on
this threat bias index reﬂects the facilitated processing of threat
word content relative to non-threat word content, consistent with
selective attentional bias to threatening information. The threat
bias index was analyzed by examining the effects of Modiﬁcation
Type (engagement vs. disengagement) and Modiﬁcation Direction
(increase threat processing vs. decrease threat processing) to deter-
mine whether the targeted attentional biases had been induced.
Finally the negative thought intrusion data was analyzed to deter-
mine the effects of Modiﬁcation Type and Modiﬁcation Direction,
Time (pre- vs. post-worry induction) and Rater (participant vs.
assessor).
3.2. Attentional bias induction task
3.2.1. Accuracy
Accurate responses to target words averaged 95.8% (SD=2.8) on
training trials, and 96.1% (SD=2.7) on assessment trials, with no
signiﬁcant difference in accuracy between the four groups (F<1;
F(3,63) =1.03, ns). Hence, any group differences on assessment tri-
als couldnot be attributed todifferential speed-accuracy trade-offs.
3.2.2. Assessment trials
A two-way ANOVA was carried out on these threat bias index
scores that considered the between-group factors: Modiﬁcation
Type (Engagement vs. Disengagement); and Modiﬁcation Direc-
tion (increase threat processing vs. decrease threat processing).
See Table 2 for means and standard deviations. As expected, this
analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of Modiﬁcation Direc-
tion, F(1,60) =15.52, p< .001, f2 = 0.50. This reﬂected the fact that
participants in the decrease threat processing groups obtained
lower threat bias index scores than did those in the increase
threat processing groups (M=−130.64, SD=166.54, vs. M=42.92,
SD=184.71). Therefore, as intended, the bias induction procedure
did indeed appear to induce group differences in selective atten-
tion to threat meanings. Importantly, Modiﬁcation Type did not
inﬂuence attentional bias index scores, either as a main effect
F(1,60) =1.34, ns., f2 = 0.15, or in an interaction involving Modiﬁ-
cation Direction, F<1. Hence the procedures designed to induce
a group difference in attentional bias through the manipulation
of selective engagement with, and selective disengagement from,
threat meanings were equally effective in inducing such a group
difference in attentional bias. Indeed, t-tests on threat bias index
scores, revealed similar effects of Modiﬁcation Direction, in terms
of the resulting magnitude of group difference in attentional
bias, whether the induction procedure targeted engagement bias
(t(30) =2.96, p< .01, d=1.08) or disengagement bias (t(30) =2.60,
p< .05, d=0.95).3.3. Worry task
The number of negative thought intrusions recorded during
each breathing focus period, as categorized by participants and
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Table 2
Median attention modiﬁcation test trial response latencies and threat bias index for each condition (standard deviations in parentheses).
Modiﬁcation Direction Condition Trial valence Threat bias index
Non-threat Threat
Encourage threat engagement 1017.50 (225.47) 986.2500 (221.52) 31.25 (180.65)
1
a
a
M
m
(
T
i
T
f
t
c
i
f
f
T
i
w
e
t
(
t
i
D
t
b
m
n
a
t
v
t
t
t
a
d
m
t
w
t
c
t
m
g
w
T
M
iIncrease threat processing
Discourage threat disengagement
Decrease threat processing
Discourage threat engagement
Encourage threat disengagement
ssessor, are presented in Table 3. These data were analyzed in
mixed-model ANOVA with two between-participants factors,
odiﬁcation Type and Modiﬁcation Direction, and two repeated
easures factors, Time (pre- vs. post-worry induction) and Rater
participant vs. assessor). This analysis revealed a main effect of
ime, F(1,60) =9.89, p< .005, f2 = 0.40, with more negative thought
ntrusions post- than pre-worry induction (M=1.95 vs. M=1.35).
here was also a main effect of Rater, F(1,30) =4.76, p< .05,
2 = 0.28, with participants themselves identifying more negative
hought intrusions than the assessor (M=1.76 vs. M=1.55). More
ritically, a signiﬁcant interactionnowwasobtainedbetweenMod-
ﬁcation Type and Modiﬁcation Direction, F(1,60) =5.15, p< .05,
2 = 0.29, which was the only other signiﬁcant effect to emerge
rom the analysis. This interaction was not further qualiﬁed by
ime (F(1,30) =1.12, ns.), suggesting that the impact of modify-
ng attentional selectivity was not restricted to the persistence of
orry only after it was experimentally induced, but was equally
vident on the measure of tendency to worry taken prior to
he experimental worry induction. Nor was it modiﬁed by Rater
F<1), indicating that it did not reﬂect the impact of bias induc-
ion on participants’ criteria for classifying the valence of thought
ntrusions.
The interaction between Modiﬁcation Type and Modiﬁcation
irection was investigated further. For participants exposed to
he procedure designed to create a group difference in attentional
ias through inducing discrepant patterns of selective disengage-
ent from threat, there was no effect of Modiﬁcation Direction on
egative thought intrusions, with a similar number of such neg-
tive intrusions being evidenced across the conditions designed
o decrease or to increase threat processing (M=1.92, SD=1.38,
s. M=1.67, SD=1.76 t<1). In contrast, for participants exposed
o the procedure designed to create differential attentional bias
hrough inducingdiscrepant patterns of selective engagementwith
hreat, there was a strong effect of Modiﬁcation Direction on neg-
tive thought intrusions. Speciﬁcally, the condition designed to
ecrease threat processing (discourage engagement with threat
eanings) now led to fewer negative intrusions than did the condi-
iondesigned to increase threatprocessing (encourageengagement
ith threat meanings; M=0.83, SD=0.62 vs. M=2.19, SD=1.63;
(30) =3.12, p< .01, d=1.14). Thus, when the bias induction pro-
edure served to induce a group difference in selective attention to
hreat through a contingencydesigned to affect attentional engage-
ent with threat, then it also served to create a corresponding
roupdifference inworry symptomatology,whichwas not the case
hen differential attention to threat instead was induced through
able 3
ean number of negative thought intrusions for each condition during the worry task pr
n parentheses).
Modiﬁcation Direction Condition Pre
Se
Increase threat processing
Encourage threat engagement 2.0
Discourage threat disengagement 1.5
Decrease threat processing
Discourage threat engagement 0.9
Encourage threat disengagement 1.4007.53 (237.41) 952.94 (126.42) 54.59 (193.87)
913.31 (142.89) 1083.34 (245.57) −170.03 (202.86)
916.25 (166.80) 1007.50 (162.87) −91.25 (113.38)
a contingency designed to affect attentional disengagement from
threat.
4. Discussion
This study introduces a novel attentional bias modiﬁcation
method, designed to induce groupdifferences in selective attention
to threat meaning, rather than only to the spatial location of threat
stimuli. Participants who completed attentional induction proce-
dures designed to decrease processing of threat meanings were
slower to process the semantic content of threat words relative
to non-threat words than were participants assigned to induction
procedures designed to increase threat processing. This effect was
equally evident whether the bias induction procedure involved
training that targeted biased attentional engagement with, or
biasedattentionaldisengagement from, threatmeanings.However,
while these different induction bias procedureswere equally effec-
tive in inducing differential selective attention to threat meanings,
they had quite different effects on subsequent patterns of worry.
When the attentional bias induction procedure encouraged
selective attentional engagement with threat meanings, the fre-
quency of negative thought intrusions on the worry task was
greater than when the procedure was designed to discourage
selective engagement with threat meanings. In contrast, no such
differences in negative thought intrusions were found between
the attentional bias induction procedures designed to encourage or
discourage selective attentional disengagement from threatmean-
ings. These ﬁndings are not readily attributable to differences in
performance accuracy between the alternative attention induc-
tion tasks, since groups did not differ in these respects. Rather,
this pattern of results indicates that variability in selective atten-
tional engagement with threat, but not variability in attentional
disengagement from threat, causally impacts on negative thought
intrusions indicativeofworry. Consequentlywesuggest that biased
attentional engagement with threat meanings inﬂuences the ten-
dency to worry, perhaps by affecting the degree to which selective
attention is drawn towards those negative aspects of the situation
that serve to trigger negative thoughts.
Previous research has yielded evidence that elevated anxiety
vulnerability is associated with both biased attentional engage-
ment with, and biased attentional disengagement from, the spatial
locusof threatening stimuli. Asnotedearlier, suchpatternsof atten-
tion to spatial loci need not imply that anxiety vulnerability is
characterizedbybothbiased attentional engagementwith, anddis-
engagement from, threat meanings. Furthermore, even if anxiety
e-worry and post-worry periods, as rated by self and assessor (standard deviations
-worry Post-worry
lf Assessor Self Assessor
0 (1.37) 1.69 (1.19) 2.94 (2.89) 2.12 (2.42)
0 (1.41) 1.12 (1.50) 2.06 (2.23) 2.00 (2.22)
4 (1.12) 0.69 (0.70) 0.87 (0.88) 0.81 (0.98)
4 (1.31) 1.44 (1.36) 2.31 (1.74) 2.50 (1.93)
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Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997). Cognitive psychol-C.R. Hirsch et al. / Journal of An
ulnerability is found to be associatedwith both increased engage-
ent with and impaired disengagement from threat meanings,
his would not permit the inference that each form of attentional
ias contributes to anxious symptomatology. Addressing this issue
equires the development of procedures designed to induce either
ifferential selective engagement with or disengagement from
hreateningmeanings, in order to reveal their respective effects on
nxiety symptoms. The present research has adopted this approach
nd, at least with respect to worry, suggests that biased atten-
ional engagementwith threateningmeaningsmaybemore critical
han biased attentional disengagement from such information in
ausally contributing toworry-relatednegative thought intrusions.
uture research should examine whether this remains true when
eople are already engaged in worrying and in clients with Gener-
lized Anxiety Disorder.
In conclusion,wereport theﬁrst attempt to inducedifferences in
elective attentional engagement with, and in selective attentional
isengagement from, threat meanings, in order to distinguish the
ausal contributions made by each pattern of attentional selectiv-
ty to worry. A procedure designed to induce differential selective
ttentional engagement with threat meanings served to inﬂuence
egative thought intrusions, whereas a procedure designed to
nduce differential attentional disengagement from threat mean-
ngs did not, despite the fact that both procedures succeeded
qually in inducing differential attentional bias. It would appear
hat enhanced attentional engagement with threat meanings may
ausally contribute to negative thought intrusions indicative of
orry.
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